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ON WILLIAMSON’S ACCOUNT OF PROPOSITIONAL EVIDENCE∗
ARTURS LOGINS
Abstract
In this paper I examine Williamson’s (2000) claim that all evidence
is propositional. I propose two objections to key premises of Willi-
amson’s argument. The first is a critique of Williamson’s claim that
we choose between hypotheses on the basis of our evidence. The
second objection is that Williamson’s claim that evidence is an ex-
planandum of a hypothesis leads to counter-intuitive consequences.
1. Introduction
In his influential book Knowledge and its limits Timothy Williamson (2000)
has claimed that all evidence one possesses is propositional. This, in turn,
is a necessary premise for the argument to the conclusion that all and only
evidence is knowledge (E=K).1
The focus of this paper is to raise objections to Williamson’s propositional
account of evidence. I claim that even if, on my account, the E=K equation
can be maintained, it nevertheless grounds a more permissive account of
what evidence is.
I propose to re-examine Williamson’s argument, offering some critical re-
marks and objections. In section 2, I present Williamson’s argument for
the propositional nature of evidence. In section 3, I provide two arguments
against two premises of Williamson’s argument, namely the claim that evi-
dence enables us to choose between hypotheses and, secondly, the claim that
it is central for evidence to be an explanandum of an explanation. I show that
this claim has some serious problems because of ambiguity in what is meant
by explanation. I show that Williamson’s account has some very counter-
intuitive consequences.
∗The research leading to this paper was supported by the Swiss National Science Foun-
dation (SNSF) grant number 100015 131794. I would like to thank Brian Ball, Pascal Engel,
Davide Fassio, Matthew Kennedy, Kevin Mulligan for their comments and discussions. Ear-
lier materials from this paper were presented at VAF IV conference in Leuven January 2010
and in Phileas Talks in Geneva December 2009.
1 Since for Williamson (2000) there is only propositional knowledge.
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2. Williamson on propositional evidence
The point of departure for Williamson’s (2000) argument for the proposi-
tionality of evidence is the claim that what evidence does is enabling us to
choose between competing hypotheses. Williamson (2000) claims (premise
1) that “we often choose between hypotheses by asking which of them best
explains our evidence” (p. 194). This choice that we are making between
competing hypotheses is determined by Inferences to the Best Explanations
(IBE) whereby which hypothesis we choose is the one that best explains the
evidence. Williamson claims here that we are (often) using IBEs to provide
an explanation for some evidence.2 From this follows (premise 2), namely
evidence is what a hypothesis explains3 (p. 195).
The next step of the argument is the claim (premise 3) that if a hypothesis
explains an item, then this item must be of a propositional kind, whilst next
premise (premise 4) states that an item which is explained by a hypothesis
is propositional (p. 195). From this follows (the conclusion) that evidence is
propositional.
For the argument to work Williamson needs to show that the premises of
the argument are true. Especially central premises — premises 2 and 3 —
should be motivated. Premise 2 contains an assumption that evidence is an
explanandum of a hypothesis (Evidence as Explanandum of an Hypothesis
(EE)) and premise 3 contains an assumption that what a hypothesis explains
is (necessarily) propositional (Propositionality of Explanandum (PE)).
According to Williamson’s argumentation the assumption (EE), as the
content of the premise 2, is grounded, because it is implied by premise 1.
He argued for premise 1 by observing that it is in our usual, ordinary prac-
tice to choose between hypotheses on the basis of evidence (by the Inference
to the Best Explanation). The fact that IBE is providing explanations shows
that it is crucial for evidence to be an explanandum of a hypothesis.
With regards to premise 3 (or the (PE) assumption) Williamson argues
for it by showing that it can’t be the case that there is something which is
a kind of thing which a hypothesis explains, but which at the same time is
not propositional. This is shown, according to Williamson by considering
“that-clauses”. The main idea is that the kind of thing which a hypothesis
2 Notice that Williamson’s argument is itself an implicit IBE — the assumption that it is
a central function of evidence to serve in the IBE is (an attempt to) the best explanation of
our ordinary, regular use of evidence. But Williamson himself affirms that IBE is not always
acceptable, as when he claims that “[e]ven if inference to the best explanation is not legitimate
in all theoretical contexts. . . ” (p. 194). One could doubt whether this highly theoretical case
is a case where IBE is acceptable.
3 This holds because it is an exemplification of this schema: (ii) is implied from (i) where
— (i) x is explained by a hypothesis through an IBE and (ii) x is explained by a hypothesis.
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explains must have a structure which respects “that-clause” structure, other-
wise it will not be possible to explain it properly. Williamson argues that a
single word does not give an explanation (is not a proper explanation) since
explanation must be structured by “that-clauses” (p. 195). And it is never the
case, according to Williamson that something that is the kind of thing which
hypotheses explain doesn’t have a structure expressed by ‘that’ clause.4
To sum up, this is the structure of Williamson’s argument (PropE):
(1) (EE) is grounded in our usual epistemic practice (evidence is what
serves in our Inferences to the Best Explanation (IBE)).
(2) Thus, by inference to the best explanation of (1), (EE): x constitutes
evidence iff x is explanandum of a hypothesis (is what a hypothesis
explains).
(3) (PE): x is explained by a hypothesis only if x is propositional.
(4) (PE) is grounded in our language use — viz. the use of “that clauses”
plus the assumption that “that clauses” enable us to give sufficiently
specified explanations (i.e. an unspecified x (= without a “that
clause”) is a source of infinity of propositions and cannot constitute
an explanation)
(5) By (EE) and (PE) follows the conclusion: if x is evidence, then x is
propositional.
A more accurate restatement of Williamson’s argument should mention a
further aspect of Williamson’s position:
(EVIDENCE) x is S’s evidence iff (i) x serves the central function of
evidence AND (ii) x is grasped/accessed by S.
Where (i) is explained as follows:
(CEF) x serves the central function of evidence iff x is an explanandum of
a hypothesis by IBE.
In my previous formulations I presented (EE) in terms of what necessary
and sufficient conditions an item should satisfy to be counted as evidence.
That is not completely exact. Instead I should have presented (EE) in terms
4 There are two ways one could object to the (PE) claim. First, one could argue against
the argument from the use of “that-clauses”, one way to do so would be to affirm that expla-
nations without the use of the “that-clause” are genuine, not ill-formed explanations (Pryor
(2007) considers one such tactic. Turri (2009) objects to positions which assume that proposi-
tions can be epistemic reasons). A second objection might reject Williamson’s presupposition
that facts are propositions (among classical proponents of the view that facts are not propo-
sitions are Russell, Wittgenstein, Husserl). Thus x (a fact) can be explained without being a
proposition itself.
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of necessary and sufficient conditions5 for an item playing the central evi-
dential function. For reasons of simplicity, I assume the “short-cut”.6
I propose now to turn to a critical examination of Williamson’s argument.
3. Against Evidence as Explanandum
In this section I raise an argument against the (PropE) argument. I reject the
(EE) claim. I argue for this by giving two arguments — first I argue that
Premise 1 rests on a false presupposition, namely the idea that we are choos-
ing between hypotheses (with regards to our evidence). Second, I claim that
there is a more profound problem — the central function of evidence is not
to be an explanandum of a hypothesis, but rather to explain (or cause) a
hypothesis (belief).
Before I continue, I propose, to be clear, recalling what it actually is we
are talking about when we are talking about hypotheses here — we are in
fact talking about the content of our beliefs. Our ordinary epistemic practice
concerns beliefs and their content. It is more natural to speak about the
content of our doxastic attitudes and not hypotheses.
Not choosing between hypotheses
I propose that there is a serious problem with Williamson’s use of «choos-
ing» between hypotheses as a central aspect of what evidence makes possible
(premise 1). In our usual practice most of the time we don’t choose between
hypotheses or propositions as potential contents of beliefs (or other doxas-
tic states). To be able to choose between various entities implies that there
are those various entities, and that I have a kind of access to them (when I
am choosing between two kinds of apples in a supermarket I have a kind of
access to them, I see them, I can touch them, they are just there in front of
me, etc.). In case of potential contents of beliefs it is not clear what it would
mean for there to be various accessed potential contents of beliefs between
which I should choose: What is my access to them (if I don’t have an access
to them, how can I potentially choose between them)? Do I possess them
(prior to acquisition of evidence)? Do I acquire them on the basis of evi-
dence? If I don’t acquire them on the basis of evidence, then on the basis of
5 Williamson doesn’t give his characterisation in terms of conditions, I use it in order
to simplify argumentation, I think that this use doesn’t change anything substantial for his
argument.
6 I assume that this “short-cut” is not problematic for our purposes, as I leave to one side
the question of grasping/accessing of evidence.
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what do I acquire them?7 If I do not hold them how can I choose between
them?.8 It seems natural to assume that I should at least grasp propositions
between which I am supposed to choose one (and that prior to choosing, oth-
erwise my arrival to it is not a result of choice but an accidental guess). And
it seems also natural to assume that at least in some circumstances (most of
ordinary situations where we discover things) we don’t possess contents of
our potential beliefs (= hypotheses), we don’t even grasp them.
Therefore I claim that we don’t choose between hypotheses – potential
contents of beliefs on the basis of evidence, because we don’t possess these
contents before we come to know the evidence, and often even we could
never possess or grasp those contents without the relevant evidence. And
even if we come to believe all the relevant alternatives after acquiring knowl-
edge of some piece of evidence, it doesn’t seem plausible that we would
choose between them. To choose between hypotheses (contents of beliefs)
would mean that we are evaluating them, comparing them and then picking
out one which is the most appropriate (whatever it would mean). But that
doesn’t seem to be the way in which we react to evidence. We acquire a
piece of evidence, say a piece of strange information and posterior to it we
formulate some surprising ideas which we are able to grasp only thanks to
the new evidence.
Thus I conclude that it is not the case that we are undergoing IBE’s when
we are faced with some evidence. Often we do not even consider other
propositions but only the one which we form in the face of evidence. Instead,
it seems that, given some background information in place, when we have
evidence e, we simply infer by default some other proposition p. Usually,
having evidence does not imply choosing between hypotheses. Thus I reject
premise 1 of the argument. And if premise 1 doesn’t hold then it creates
problems for the rest of the argument — premise 2 is no longer justified.
However one could maintain that even if we should reject premise 1, one
could hold that it is central for a piece of evidence to be an explanandum of
a hypothesis. I now turn to this central claim.
7 This causes a dilemma for Williamson: either these beliefs are already possessed, which
seems extremely implausible — how can we possess (psychologically) beliefs which explain
some evidence, before we come to know that evidence? Or on the other hand, we acquire
these beliefs. But then on the basis of what do we acquire them? It is rather common to
speak about epistemic reasons, on the basis of which our beliefs are acquired. But given the
similarity between epistemic reasons and evidence, Williamson can’t motivate acquisition of
beliefs on the basis of epistemic reasons because this would reverse his point of view.
8 Another problem is that there are often cases where there are no competing hypotheses,
but only one hypothesis.
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Not an explanandum
My second objection to Williamson’s argument concerns his key claim that
evidence is what a hypothesis explains. There are cases, I claim, where we
have evidence e in support of a proposition p, but p does not explain e for us.
Consider the following case.9 Long time ago, Chevalier X had a love af-
fair with a maid. That love affair made him mad. One day, in an excess
of jealousy, he killed the maid when he saw her flirting with another man.
Moved by grief, he had erected a tower of a specific height so that its shadow
would cover the spot where he first proclaimed his love to the maid every af-
ternoon. Now, many years after the murder, Chevalier X tries to find once
again the place where he proclaimed his love to the maid for the first time.
He arrives near the tower in an afternoon and sees the shadow of the tower
covering the precise spot. It seems that there is a a piece of evidence e that
Chevalier possesses: “The shadow of the tower covers exactly this precise
spot of the land”, and it seems that this piece of evidence e is evidence in
support of a proposition p, for him: “I’ve proclaimed my love to the maid
for the first time exactly here”. However, it doesn’t seem right to say that p
explains e for Chevalier X. The mere proposition p is not the explanation of
e. There is no direct and simple explanatory link between e and p. Hence,
there are cases (I believe that the Chevalier case is not an isolated phenome-
non) where someone can possess evidence in favour of a proposition without
that that proposition explains the piece of evidence.
Now, the obvious reply that one could make against this objection, is to
claim that although p is not the explanation of e, it is nevertheless a part
of the explanation of e. In order to possess the full explanation of e other
propositions are also needed, such as “I had erected a tower of a specific
height”, “A n-meters high tower will produce a shadow of m-meters”, “I
had intention to mark the spot with a shadow from a tower”, etc. Only a
whole set of such propositions constitutes the explanation of e. However,
importantly, e is what is (in part) explained by p.
This reply is unsatisfactory, however. There are two problems with it.
First, there seem to be no non ad-hoc (or non pragmatic10 ) way of distin-
guishing p from other propositions among the full explanation of e. But this
9 Adapted from van Fraassen 1980.
10 One could follow van Fraassen 1980 and endorse the claim that explanations are prag-
matically determined. And then, accept that what evidence is, after all, is also determined
in part by pragmatic factors (in virtue of its being an explanandum). This move is not avail-
able to Williamson, however. Since he explicitly (Williamson 2005) denies that pragmatical
factors determine knowledge possession. And according to Williamson, the set of known
propositions by a subject S just is the set of evidence that S possesses. Hence, if Williamson
allowed that evidence is pragmatically determined, then he also had to allow that knowledge
is pragmatically determined.
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is problematic, since p seems to enjoy a special status with regards to e. It
seems that e is evidence for p, for Chevalier, it is not evidence for some
other proposition for him, such as p′: “A n-meters high tower will produce
a shadow of m-meters”, or if it is, then only secondarily. One cannot, for
instance, appeal to probabilities, in order to explain this special status of p
with regards to e, since, p′ conditional on e does not seem to be less prob-
able with regards to unconditional p′, than is p conditional on e compared
to unconditional p. Hence, it seems there is no way to account, within this
framework, for the fact that e is evidence for p, rather than for p′, for Cheva-
lier (or that, primarily, e is evidence for p and not for other propositions, for
Chevalier). Second problem is even more radical one. On pain of having an
ad hoc approach, everything within the full causal history of e, going back
to the Big Bang, should be included as a part of the full explanation of e. But
we surely don’t want to define evidence e as what is explained by the full
causal history of e, going back to the Big Bang. But then, if we don’t have
theoretically satisfactory way to identify a particular partial explanation and
we don’t want the whole set of the full explanation to be what explains a
piece of evidence e, then we have to conclude that evidence is not what is
explained by a hypothesis.
On the contrary, it is natural to think that evidence just is what enables us
to form a belief, or to make inferences. There is a sense in which a belief
or positioning a hypothesis is a response to evidence. Sherlock Holmes,
for example, gathers evidence before forming a hypothesis. And when a
sufficient amount of evidence is gathered he forms a hypothesis. Evidence
is what enables him to state an explanatory hypothesis.
Thus I conclude that (EE) does not state the central function of evidence.
Evidence is not essentially an explanandum for a hypothesis.
If (EE) doesn’t hold then the (PropE) argument doesn’t hold. (EE) is false.
Thus the (PropE) argument doesn’t hold. It doesn’t show that all evidence is
necessarily propositional.
Conclusion
I have considered Williamson’s argument for the claim that all evidence is
propositional. I have claimed that his argument doesn’t hold, because two
of its premises are not true. I have not claimed, however, that there is non-
propositional evidence. There might be other good arguments in favour of
the propositionality of evidence. This larger question is left for another in-
vestigation.
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